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Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 23, 111 P.3d 1092 (2005)1
CRIMINAL LAW
Summary
In April 2001, Hymon stole a purse from a woman in the lobby of an auto repair shop. He
ran, and two of the shop’s mechanics pursued him. They caught up to him when he fell on the
curb, but he stood and swung a four- to six-inch long pocketknife. They backed away, allowing
him to escape, but the police apprehended him shortly thereafter.
After Hymon requested to represent himself, the district court conducted a Faretta
canvass,2 and concluded that Hymon was competent to waive his right to counsel. Hymon was
uncooperative and unwilling to communicate with the prosecutor, so the district court revoked
Hymon’s right to represent himself and appointed counsel. At a calendar call in November
2001, Hymon claimed he was being represented against his will and denied his right to selfrepresentation. The district court conducted another Faretta canvass, during which Hymon again
gave appropriate responses. However, the district court was concerned with Hymon’s
understanding of his available defenses – one of his main reasons for wanting to represent
himself was that his counsel would not present the defense he wanted (denial of due process).
The district court allowed Hymon to represent himself, but also appointed standby counsel.
During the trial, Hymon was ordered to wear a stun belt because of a letter he had sent.
The letter requested that the Civil Rights Volunteers make the district court judge recuse himself,
and also stated, “If I have to, I will murder him.” In trial, Hymon focused on the violation of his
rights, and, as an example, opened his clothes to reveal the stun belt. Following a guilty verdict,
the State presented certified copies of Hymon’s prior convictions, and the district court found
Hymon to be a habitual criminal. However, the State never requested to have the judgments of
conviction admitted, and the district court never stated that they were admitted.
On appeal, Hymon asserted that the district court: (1) should have promptly disclosed
that it had received a copy of the letter and conducted a hearing before requiring him to wear a
stun belt, (2) abused its discretion by allowing Hymon to represent himself after performing an
inadequate Faretta canvass, and (3) erred by sentencing Hymon as a habitual criminal when the
judgments of conviction were not admitted into evidence.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that while the district court should have disclosed its
receipt of the letter and held a hearing on the use of the stun belt, such error was harmless as
there existed an essential state interest in compelling Hymon to wear a stun belt. The court also
held that the district court’s Faretta canvass was sufficient; that Hymon was competent to waive
his right to counsel, and that such waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Finally, the
court held that it was not error to sentence Hymon as a habitual criminal because it was clear that
the prior convictions were introduced as evidence, argued by the parties, and considered by the
court.
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By Bryson D. Perkins
In a Faretta canvass, the district court questions a defendant on the topics listed in SCR 253 to determine if the
defendant is competent to waive his right to counsel, and is doing so freely, voluntarily, and knowingly. See Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
2

Issue and Disposition
Issues
(1) Stun Belt: Under what circumstances may a district court compel a defendant to wear
a stun belt during the guilt phase of a trial?
(2) Faretta Canvass: What must a court determine in order to allow a defendant to waive
his right to counsel, and represent himself?
(3) Habitual Criminals: Is it error for a court to sentence a defendant as a habitual
criminal when copies of prior conviction judgments are not actually admitted into evidence?
Dispositions
(1) Stun Belt: To compel a defendant to wear a stun belt, a district court must hold a
hearing wherein it determines that an essential state interest exists. It must also consider less
restrictive means of restraint. Additionally, the court must: make factual findings regarding the
belt’s operation; address the criteria for activating the belt; address the possibility of accidental
activation; inquire into the belt’s potential adverse psychological effects; and consider the health
of the individual defendant. The court’s rationale must be placed on the record, and the ultimate
decision must be made by the court rather than by law enforcement.
(2) Faretta Canvass: A court must determine that a defendant is competent to waive his
right to counsel, and that such waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. A court
should conduct a Faretta canvass to make this determination and to apprise the defendant of the
risks involved. However, the mechanical performance of a Faretta canvass is not necessary, and
even the omission of a canvass is not error as long as the defendant was competent, and that the
waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.
(3) Habitual Criminals: No. Where it is unclear whether certified copies of prior
conviction judgments were admitted into evidence, but it is clear that such convictions were
introduced, argued, and considered, it is not error for the court to sentence the defendant as a
habitual criminal.

Commentary
State of the Law Before Hymon v. State
Stun Belt
A stun belt is a means of prisoner restraint that is worn beneath the clothes and is not
visible to the jury. When activated, which has happened accidentally in some cases, the belt
delivers an electrical current through the body that can sometimes cause incapacitation, severe
pain, uncontrolled defecation or urination, muscular weakness, heartbeat irregularities, and/or
seizures.3 Restraining a defendant during trial raises several constitutional concerns. The sight
of physical restraints may have a significant effect on the jury by eroding the presumption of
innocence which is an integral part of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.4 Notably, the United
3

See Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 899-900; United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002); Dickson v. State, 108 Nev. 1, 3,
822 P.2d 1122, 1124 (1992).
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States Supreme Court has held that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during the
penalty phase of a capital proceeding, as well as during the guilty phase, unless the use is
justified by an essential state interest.5 Because a stun belt can be concealed beneath the
defendant’s clothing, this is less of a concern than the more traditional forms of restraint.
Nevertheless, other constitutional concerns may be elevated by the use of a stun belt.
The defendant’s anxiety is likely increased by the fear of receiving a painful and humiliating
shock for any gesture that could be perceived as threatening. A defendant has a right to confer
with counsel, to be present at trial, and to participate in his defense. All of these activities are
impeded by the defendant’s focus and anxiety being occupied by the possible triggering of the
belt.6 Many criminal trials rest on the credibility of the witnesses. The presence of a stun belt is
likely to adversely affect the defendant’s demeanor on the stand, making the stun belt
significant.7 Furthermore, all of these concerns are elevated even more when a defendant is
representing himself. The defendant must focus intently on the proceedings so that he does not
miss an issue or a possible objection. He may be concerned about voicing a vehement objection
or actively cross-examining a witness. It is for these reasons that the use of a stun belt is
subjected to close judicial scrutiny.8
Faretta canvass
The United States and Nevada Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to selfrepresentation.9 Denial of that right is per se reversible error.10 However, before allowing a
defendant to waive counsel and represent himself, the trial court must ensure that the defendant
is competent and that the waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.11 Trial courts
should conduct a Faretta canvass to apprise “the defendant fully of the risks of selfrepresentation and of the nature of the charged crime so that the defendant’s decision is made
with a ‘clear comprehension of the attendant risks.’”12
Supreme Court Rule 253(2) states that during a Faretta canvass the district court should
inform the defendant of dangers, disadvantages and consequences of self-representation. The
rule lists specific warnings that the district court should offer. Rule 253(3) states that the canvass
may include questions about the defendant personally, and about the defendant’s knowledge and
understanding of the proceedings against him. Finally, Rule 253(4) directs the court to make
findings on the record concerning the defendant’s competency to waive counsel, and whether
such waiver is done freely, voluntarily and knowingly.
The Nevada Supreme Court has “rejected the necessity of a mechanical performance of a
Faretta canvass. Even the omission of a canvass is not reversible error if ‘it appears from the
whole record that the defendant knew his rights and insisted upon representing himself.’”13
Deference is given to the district court’s decision because “through face-to-face interaction in the
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Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005).
Durham, 287 F. 3d 1297.
7
Gonzalez, 341 F.3d at 900.
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Durham, 287 F. 3d at 1304; Gonzalez, 341 F.3d at 901.
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Wayne v. State, 100 Nev. 582, 584, 691 P.2d 414, 415 (1984).
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McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).
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Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
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Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 164, 17 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2001) (citing Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001,
946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124, 912 P.2d 234, 238 (1996))).
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Graves, 112 Nev. at 125, 912 P.2d at 238 (quoting Wayne, 100 Nev. at 585, 691 P.2d at 416).
6

courtroom, the trial judges are much more competent to judge a defendant’s understanding than
this court. The cold record is a poor substitute for demeanor observation.”14
Habitual criminality
As long ago as 1966, the Nevada Supreme Court established that in order for a defendant
to be sentenced as a habitual criminal, the State must prove the defendant’s prior convictions
beyond a reasonable doubt.15 By statute, a “certified copy of a felony conviction is prima facie
evidence of conviction of a prior felony.”16
Effect of Hymon v. State on Current Law
Stun Belt
The Nevada Supreme Court clarified that in order for a district court to compel a
defendant to wear a stun belt, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether an essential
state interest exists, such as special security needs or specific escape risks. As part of this
determination, the court must consider less restrictive means of restraint. Additionally, the court
must:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

make factual findings regarding the belt’s operation;
address the criteria for activating the belt;
address the possibility of accidental activation;
inquire into the belt’s potential adverse psychological effects; and
consider the health of the individual defendant.

The district court’s rationale must be placed on the record to enable the Nevada Supreme Court
to determine if use of a stun belt was an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the decision to use a
stun belt must be made by the court, and not be made by law enforcement.
The Hymon court held that the district court’s failure to hold a hearing was harmless error
because the record sufficiently demonstrated an essential state interest in compelling Hymon to
wear the stun belt. The record indicated that Hymon posed a substantial security risk in the
courtroom and had also directly threatened the trial court judge. Any prejudice on the part of the
jury was caused by Hymon ripping open his clothes during opening arguments, thus making the
jury aware of the existence of the belt. The court instructed the jury that the belt was a standard
security procedure and that they should not draw any inferences from it concerning the
defendant’s character or propensity for violence. Finally, the court made the ultimate decision to
use the belt.
Faretta Canvass
Applying established precedent regarding a Faretta canvass and Nevada Supreme Court
Rules, the Hymon court reiterated that to waive the right to counsel, a defendant must be
competent and must waive such right knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. Although the
record seemed to indicate that the district court was under the impression that competency was
enough, the Hymon court concluded that the record also supported its holding that Hymon’s
waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.
14

Id. at 124, 912 P.2d at 238.
Hollander v. State, 82 Nev. 345, 349-50, 418 P.2d 802, 804 (1966).
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Habitual Criminality
While the Hymon court noted that the better practice is for the district court to clearly
enunciate that evidence has been admitted, it concluded that the failure to use precise words is
not fatal. The court held that the district court did not commit error in sentencing Hymon as a
habitual criminal because it was clear that the prior conviction documents were received into
evidence, the parties argued them,17 and the court considered them in making its determination.
Unanswered Questions
The Nevada Supreme Court declared that in order to compel a defendant to wear a stun
belt, the district court must conduct a hearing to determine whether an essential state interest
exists. Yet, in Hymon, the district court held no such hearing. The Hymon court found this to be
harmless error, since the record reflected that there was an essential state interest. It is unclear,
then, how mandatory the hearing requirement really is. If the record in a future case clearly
shows an essential state interest, but the court fails to hold a hearing, what would be the Nevada
Supreme Court’s ruling? Would it enforce the rule that a hearing must be held, or would it find
the failure to be harmless error, as it did in Hymon?
Conclusion
To compel a defendant to wear a stun belt, a district court must hold a hearing to
determine if an essential state interest exists, and should consider less restrictive means of
restraint. The court must make factual findings regarding the belt’s operation; address the criteria
for activating the belt; address the possibility of accidental activation; inquire into the belt’s
potential adverse psychological effects; and consider the health of the individual defendant.
Additionally, the ultimate decision must be made by the court, and the court must put its
rationale on the record.
In allowing a defendant to waive his right counsel, a district court must determine that the
defendant is competent to waive this right, and that such waiver is done knowingly, voluntarily
and intelligently. A Faretta canvass should be done to apprise the defendant of the attendant risks
of self-representation. Questions during the canvass may include topics listed in the Supreme
Court Rules.
Although it would be best to clearly enunciate that prior convictions are admitted into
evidence, a district court may still sentence a defendant as a habitual criminal if it is clear that the
court considered such convictions in making its determination.
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In fact, Hymon successfully argued against the validity of one of the convictions.

